Burma’s Constitutional Time Bomb

Burma’s Constitutional Time Bomb (Editorial)
By The Irrawaddy
September 3, 2007

Any constitution is, of course, better than none. The fight for democratic rights is more effective within a constitutional framework than under a military regime ruling without any such guidelines. Also, history tells us that no country can build a democracy within just a few years.

These are some of the reasons why Burmese ethnic ceasefire groups have been participating in Burma’s National Convention. They also encapsulate the dreams of many Burmese politicians and scholars, both within and outside the country, for one last chance to win their constitutional rights.

But can they really fight for their rights within the constitutional framework being drawn up by the National Convention? The answer is “no,” if the basic principles for the new constitution that have now been adopted are anything to go by.

As the National Convention comes to a close, the Burmese generals are leading the country to a military-dominated “command democracy” against the will of all parties, including the 1990 election victors and the ethnic minority groups.

The new constitutional guidelines adopted by the National Convention reveal that the generals have carefully maneuvered themselves into the position of possessing “double rights” under the terms of the constitution.

First, the military is guaranteed 110 seats in a future parliament—25 percent of the 440 seats in the new assembly. Second, an estimated 450,000 members of the armed forces, who also have the vote, will be called upon to elect pro-military representatives in the constituencies where the military deploys its battalions. The regime won’t make the same mistake as it did in the 1990 election, when most members of the armed forces voted for the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy.

In such a situation, even a democratic party that wins a majority of 330 seats in future elections will be unable to amend the constitution to adopt laws guaranteeing more civil and political rights for the people, because the parliament will need “the prior approval of more than 75 percent of all the members of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (people’s assembly).”

In order to cement their power even more strongly, the generals inserted a clause in Section 4 (a) of the chapter “Amendment of the Constitution” stipulating that after adopting the amended law with the approval of more than 75 percent of the parliament, the proposed amendment would have to be approved by more than 50 percent of voters in a national referendum.

Even at this stage, the generals can’t feel certain of their grip on power. They make this clear again in the chapter entitled “Provisions on State of Emergency,” which allows the commander-in-chief of the armed forces “to declare a state of emergency” and to exercise countrywide “legislative, executive and judicial powers.”

The provision gives the generals the power to dissolve not only the elected parliament but also the state cabinet if they try to amend or enact a law against the will of the military.

In the face of such undemocratic principles adopted by the military to legitimate their power in accordance with the constitution, the NLD and other ethnic parties have consistently opposed the National Convention.

Now it’s the turn of the ethnic ceasefire groups attending the convention. Because of their economic interests, they have been coerced by the regime to accept the constitutional right of military rule.

In the final session of the National Convention, for instance, the Kachin Independence Organization submitted a proposal for more ethnic rights, fueling the generals’ anger and leading to immense pressure on the KIO’s business interests in Kachin State.

In addition, soldiers of the United Wa State Army have begun preparation for possible future battles with the military regime after the group’s leaders refused to follow an official order to move their units deployed near the Thai-Burmese border to the group’s headquarters in Panghsang.

Burma is now sitting on a time bomb. The regime’s uncompromising insistence on holding onto power is the fuse. The explosion can occur whenever the ethnic ceasefire groups lose their place in a future union that holds the promise of equal rights and representation under the law.